computer components called "sensors" designed to detect various bodily phenomena, such as perspiration rates, or the levels of glucose or oxygen in blood. Biosensors take signals from these things and turn them into electronic data. He had seen the technical trajectory for biosensorsthey were getting smaller and cheaper, just as computers had gone from mainframes to PCs.
Because miniaturization had enabled computing to go from an expert-only affair to everyday use by nonengineers, he projected that biosensors would similarly no longer be limited to large medical labs with large budgets. An ordinary person could buy one. Would they want to, though, or was this a mere flight of industry fancy? If mass adoption of personal biosensors were to happen, the commercial implications could be enormous-not just for Intel, but also for many firms across a variety of industries.
I thought about it. The implications sent shivers down my spine. Being somewhat familiar with the basic lessons of medical anthropology, and even more familiar with the ways that expert forms of knowledge have become tools of social control by subjecting anything and everything to quantification, whether appropriate or not, this seemed like a spectacularly bad idea. To my mind the implication was a clear probability that these technologies would exacerbate this deeply problematic form of social control. It is a job requirement to speak up when I have reason to believe either that there is no market for the technologies under consideration, or that the social risks and institutional costs of entering that market make it a poor idea. This seemed to clearly fall into the latter category, and I was prepared to tell him so.
I remember that a now-embarrassing smugness came over me in this moment. I resembled the breed of critic Latour (2004) so roundly lampoons, who revels in showing the naïve believers in a technology that "whatever [the believers] think, their behavior is entirely Authors: This is your final opportunity to revise. The MIT Press does not allow revision of content in page proofs.
Page 3 of 33 determined by the action of powerful causalities coming from objective reality they don't see [social structure, power, etc.] , but that you, yes you, the never sleeping critic, alone can see" (239) . In truth, I wanted nothing more than to give my colleague an earful about panopticality and Foucault, but my experience had been that delivering earfuls rarely ends well. Instead I appealed to empiricism. I explained how the predecessors to these technologies-bathroom scales-in fact have not succeeded in "encouraging" people to lose weight, but more often simply add to the intense guilt, shame, and anxiety people already have about their bodies. The Foucauldians would note that that is the point to such things-that social control happens not just by legal fiat or physical violence, but also by the capacity to convince people to see themselves only through the lens of what the more powerful would see (here, the narrow band of "normal" weight, now statistically abnormal in the United States but defined as "normal" by the medical profession). This well-established technique of social control works by compelling people to take on the task of controlling their bodies according to the categories that others produce, as if it were one's own idea all along.
It would be fair to say that the issue was not merely an intellectual one. The very question of whether there was social or market value in biosensing technologies summoned in me the toxic combination of shame and anger I too feel when I am subjected to such "encouragements" about my body. I recalled the patronizing tone a nurse once took with me about how a "woman of your age should really be taking folic acid," without the faintest knowledge of the contents of my uterus or the painful social costs I pay for my reproductive choices. I began to imagine the horror of being sent a text message about how fat I would no doubt get if my various biosensor readings didn't change, all because a thinnish white man in Silicon Valley took it upon himself to solve the obesity crisis, 2 and offered a mobile phone-based solution that effectively turned a
Authors: This is your final opportunity to revise. The MIT Press does not allow revision of content in page proofs.
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Having mulled over these things, I told my colleague that these new biosensors are much more likely to do harm than good. I asked whether he really wanted to go into a market where actual utility is likely to be so low, and risks so high. Frankly, I didn't see reason to sponsor university research on the topic, if the answer was so obvious and clear.
"Okay, I see your point about the guilt and anxiety," he responded. "But I am a diabetic.
If I don't know my glucose level, I could die. How is that not useful?"
I had to concede the point.
What we ultimately agreed was that there was a set of empirical and theoretical questions here that required closer examination. Our answer was going to be found in the complexities and contingencies of social life, not in any claims about the utility (or lack thereof) of a particular product to a particular individual, which is what market research traffics in. It was not a problem that market research could handle, but one that raised intensely challenging social questions that only scholarship could meaningfully pursue. Figuring out whether a consumer market for biosensors was even thinkable had everything to do with whether the data they produced cohered with a cultural and social imaginary, such that users stood a chance of making sense of them. It had to do with whether socially productive design strategies were conceivable, or whether the social systems made the conditions of possibility for these technologies a dead end.
This book, then, has its origins in a controversy that shows no sign of abating. The temporary agreement with my colleague eventually became the Biosensors in Everyday Life program, a three-year program involving four universities, which provided space for us to
Authors: This is your final opportunity to revise. The MIT Press does not allow revision of content in page proofs. These are all high-stakes questions. As these devices continue to proliferate, they could yet become the very worst modernity has to offer-social control masquerading as science, and the soulless abstraction of bodies into bits, to name two ugly prospects-or they could participate in a flourishing of alternatives. There are still collective choices to make about what social logics will be mobilized, and we cannot afford to think about these technologies as finished products awaiting after-the-fact comment. Technologies are never a done deal, and this book aims to reopen the negotiations, so to speak. With less desirable paradigms in such strong positions of power, shaping these technologies into something better than the current offerings requires a tremendous amount of work, however necessary.
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This is also work that requires a more expansive notion of critique. The ability to see outside of one's current position is perhaps the only way to imagine how things might be otherwise, yet the cartoonish critic-denouncer role I initially played has little to offer those who would begin crafting, imagining, and, yes, physically building alternatives. Here I draw inspiration from Latour's version of the critic, who "is not the one who lifts the rug from under the feet of the naïve believers, but the one who offers the participants arenas in which to gather" (2004, 246) . This book is designed to be that sort of arena, socially situated in its own way but committed to enabling the broadest possible participation in the discussion of what biosensing could come to mean. It includes views from the social sciences and cultural studies, and from those who are primarily concerned with "convening" materials together into physical or digital objects.
This volume is intended to serve as a resource to inform conversations like the one I found myself in, wherever social choices about biosensors are being made. I say "choice" as a way to acknowledge the very real power many of us have to reshape our material world, including those of us without formal positions or large budgets. "Choice" is a term that has its problems, but it reminds us that he direction of our material world is not inevitable, and that readers of this book are part of its shaping. I do not say "choice" to elide the important experiences of those who have no meaningful choice when biosensing is foisted upon them, such as when an employer requires its employees to wear physical activity monitors, As chapter 5 points out, it is important that we always acknowlege when there is no neoliberal "choosing"
one's way out of such a situation. Choices are also not limited to deliberative democratic processes, or the kinds of societies that choose policies through participatory discussion and debate. The choices I have in mind involve difficult struggles and frequent failures where social
Authors: This is your final opportunity to revise. The MIT Press does not allow revision of content in page proofs. build a biosensor, it is not necessarily socially significant. A person using sensors to understand her patterns of stress may or may not care whether that stress is detected through cortisol levels in saliva using "wet" biosenors or the comparatively "dry" electroencephalogram (EEG).
In this volume, we use the term "biosensing" to refer to any practice that uses information technology to understand something about bodies or the environments in which they live, whether the technology is at the cutting edge or not. This might involve a biosensor of the type already described. It might involve one of the many sensors currently ubiquitous in computers and mobile phones, used to indicate something about the body or the environment (e.g., accelerometers which detect movement in space, microphones and cameras, timers, GPS), but which are not, strictly speaking, biosensors. Finally, it might involve manually recording
Page 9 of 33 events (the foods one ate, the mood one was in, etc.) in a mobile phone application, in a spreadsheet, or on paper to varying levels of precision. Indeed, many biosensing services invite their users to manually record additional phenomena related to what the sensors sense. This perhaps says something interesting about the limitations of sensors. Sensors now capture more than ever, and more than their designers anticipated (often called "data exhaust"), but the human capacity to imagine what is meaningful to record necessarily exceeds sensors' capabilities.
This adaptation of an engineer's term has advantages. Focusing on biosensing foregrounds the sensors, and therefore the very physical link back to what is being sensed. This connection is important, and can easily be lost in a more data-centric view, especially one that focuses on the bigness of data accumlations. By examining biosensing practices, we can follow biosensors (proper) as a set of objects that change over time, yet have much in common with their predecessors like accelerometers. Wherever they might ultimately go, we can attend to the uncertainties they encounter in their travels.
There is a nascent but rapidly growing social scientific interest in the Quantified Self community, 4 biosensors as a class of technical objects; that is, other work largely prefigures which social phenomena the technologies engage with. Not all biosensing is about the quantified self, or about big data. As both Sherman and Taylor (chapters 2 and 9 in this volume) show, not all biosensor data are aggregated at great scale, nor does "bigness" capture everything that is, or could be, Authors: This is your final opportunity to revise. The MIT Press does not allow revision of content in page proofs.
Page 10 of 33 meaningful about this data. Nor is all biosensing about measuring selves. Indeed, in Böhlen's work on water-quality sensing in Indonesia (chapter 10), the self would be a wildly inappropriate starting point. Notions of the quantified self are hardly irrelevant to this volume; indeed, the person who coined the term, Gary Wolf, is the author of chapter 4. Although sensors always quantify, "the quantified self" is deliberately not the overall framing device of the book. The phrase is too apt; it taps too strongly into longstanding Western tropes of calculative rationality and preoccupations with the individual as the privileged locus of action. Instead, the focus on biosensing requires us to slow down our judgment about who is tracking what. 6 It opens up a view onto the diversity of practices possible by making it harder to pretend that we already know, by looking at the technology itself, what sort of phenomenon we are examining-a trap I clearly fell into in my first encounter with the topic.
The purposes to which these sensors are put are varied, and you will encounter many in the chapters to come. Devices designed for fitness monitoring (that count steps and measure distance run, heart rate, etc.) are easily seen on any street in North American or European cities.
Medical and quasi-medical devices are less visible, but no less pervasive. Examples include glucose monitors, fertility monitors that track basal temperatures, implanted sensors to monitor the workings of the organs or contents of the blood, and devices that assess posture, or the sleeping position of an infant. There is an extensive literature on using sensors to remotely monitor the elderly (Mort et al. 2013; Mort, Roberts, and Callén 2013; Pols 2011) . Because that literature is fairly well known, it has not been directly addressed in this volume, but it is notable that in many senses the predecessors to these technologies can be found in assisted living facilities. It is also notable the elderly have proved as able to subvert the intentions of sensor Authors: This is your final opportunity to revise. The MIT Press does not allow revision of content in page proofs.
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Finally, biosensors are being used to understand, and keep track of, the "-omes," not just genomes but also exposomes (the pollutants to which bodies are exposed) and microbiomes (the microbes in our bodies believed to affect physical and mental states). Consumer-grade environmental monitoring technologies are less robust and more expensive than those that grew out of medicine, but they too are getting smaller and cheaper. In genome and microbiome sensing, the sensing is conducted in a lab, and participants mail in samples. Accessing such data has become relatively simple, and thus these sensors raise the same social questions as a sensor worn on the wrist. In the "-omes," the sensing capabilities largely outpace the scientific understanding of the effects on the body of the substance being sensed. Indeed, in the case of the American Gut Project, 7 participants know that the data they receive back about their bodies in exchange for contributing to that research project may or may not be interpretable.
These sensors did not simply arrive on the market free of social entanglements. The fact that we often talk about technologies as asocial objects that need to be set in some context is itself evidence of the kind of context they are in (Strathern 2001)-one that considers them to be "free" of social origins. While a full genealogy of these technologies is impossible to trace here, I
will pull on a few significant threads. Computation and medical knowledge have been intertwined since the 1960s (November 2012). The relation is most starkly visible in genomics research, where biologists use machine learning techniques to expand their statistical repertoire.
However, it was the shift in computer science toward "ubiquitous computing" in the early 1990s
(Weiser 1991) that set the stage for biomedicine's entry into popular use of computers.
Ubiquitous computing is a vision in which the best computer is the one that becomes all but
Authors: This is your final opportunity to revise. The MIT Press does not allow revision of content in page proofs. However, computer science and the information technology (IT) industry do not take all social changes surrounding them to be their cause (to wit: feminism), and so in that sense, the biomedicalization of information technologies was far from inevitable. One important mechanism by which biomedical frameworks became embedded in technical systems is through the subfield of "persuasive computing" (Fogg 2002) . In this subfield, designers of technical systems abandoned a long-standing self-image of social neutrality, and set themselves the task of "nudging" their users toward the "right" behaviors, often by using the psychology of game design ("gamification," see Whitson 2013). While this acknowledgment of social entanglement is undeniably admirable, it has also written the permission slip for technology developers to think of themselves as the enforcers of medical prescription. There are few papers in this subfield that do not take "behavior change" as their object of study and design. One does not describe the actions of others as a "behavior" unless one deems their worth questionable. One also does not
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I realize that I am now using ungenerous language, speaking more as the critic-partisan than the convener of arenas. Culture makes hypocrites of us all, and it is true that I find it difficult to summon affection for this sort of software, or to work with developers who are disinclined to acknowledge the political causes and consequences about which I care a great deal. In fact, there is more diversity and controversy within computer science than I am letting on. For example, Purpura et al. (2011) is a computer science paper in which the authors built a fictional weight loss encouragement system, "Fit4Life," by taking principles of persuasive computing to their logical extreme. It is a deliberate comment, in design form, on how easily unrestrained persuasive computing could spiral out of control. For example, Purpura and colleagues load up their system with multiple sensors used to "tunnel" users, guiding them through a staged set of interactions communicating what to do next, based on the sensors' data.
They designed in alerts encouraging other users to shame someone who no longer wears the technology. Notably, the authors found that their audience could not distinguish earnest design from provocation. the effects of planned obsolescence. The problems of modern living these apps and devices were designed to solve (obesity and its various cousins) are problems that require much longer than six months to correct. This suggests that people are not using these products as intended, yet if anything, the industry has doubled down on gamification and images of strong, disciplined, lycra-ed bodies to articulate the value their products offer. When the private sector has not responded to market signals, we have perhaps the surest sign that a cultural logic more powerful than capitalism is at work.
Time and Partial Indication
Biosensing systems have two fundamental things in common: the centrality of time, and a problematic relationship to indexicality. Tom Boellstorff (2013) reminds us that the words "data"
and "dated" are etymologically related for a reason. Data always have a date-they are that which is stamped by time, recorded as having taken place. Data generated by these technologies may or may not be associated with a location, but it most certainly will be associated with a time, often called a "time stamp." This makes biosensor data largely time-series data. 9 This is no mere technical detail. As Sherman (chapter 2) observes, time is what makes it possible to treat data abstractly, and to create new abstractions from it. Data can only become meaningful when it is brought into relation to other data (Gitelman 2013; boyd and Crawford 2011), and time is the hinge that makes this possible both mathematically and socially. Mathematically speaking, when two time series co-vary, they co-vary across time, as in the correlation that says "when my steps increase, so does my heart rate," Jumping from a single person to a population requires a decision about how time is to be handled. The correlation that says "people who take many steps also have high heart rates," contains no notion of time, and can be made by averaging all the data Authors: This is your final opportunity to revise. The MIT Press does not allow revision of content in page proofs.
Page 15 of 33 in each time series before correllating across a population. However, the second correlation does not follow from the first. We might imagine that people who take many steps have lower heart rates overall because exercise tends to lower resting heart rates while temporarily raising heart rate during exercise. If we re-introduce time through more sophisticated statistical techniques, however, a researcher can detect this more fine grained pattern.
The ability to look for patterns in time, rather than just across a population, comes from the technological conditions which make it possible to sample things at much higher rates than a survey or health record data can. In a sense, sensors lay tracks in time (Day and Lury, chapter 3).
The exact cadence of these tracks, or traces, depends on the sampling rate the sensor is set to, which can be anywhere from a second-by-second data collection, to once a day, to "when someone feels like it" in the case of manually initiated data collection. Where there are differences in sample rates, the calculation techniques can become complex, as the people processing the data must make a claim that variable X spiked at the "same time" as variable Y for practical purposes, even if their time stamps are not exactly the same. Similarly, where data have been collected from two different devices, if those devices do not use the same technique to record which time zone the person is in, chaos can ensue. A covariance in time is much harder to generate if one device/service adjusts how it records time when a person travels, and the other does not. Without good metadata, one can only guess which "5pm" those steps took place in.
Not only does time make data relate to other data, it also makes data relate to people, and to the broader cultural imaginations they possess. For example, where there is a spike in steps or heart rate, a sensor user might simply recall what else was happening when that spike occurred.
In this way, the experiential qualities of time can be a more powerful analytical tool than mathematical correlation (Ruckenstein 2014). Similarly, data examined in the moment of, say, a
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Aasarød (2012) describes the bodily sensations people have when they use continuous glucose monitors. Some use the devices to calibrate their own experiences of their body, to "learn" what a high or low level of glucose feels like by looking at it at the moment of physical sensation.
Others effectively outsource that sensing to the device, which effectively tells them what to feel.
Nevertheless, for both kinds of people it is the moment of looking that makes the tie between body and number possible.
In other contexts, longer time cycles are at stake. In Böhlen's work (chapter 10), water quality needed to be tracked over the course of a year, not just in the moment, to check that it was safe. The seasons had an effect on the water's physical attributes and therefore on the social practices around collecting and purifying it. Similarly, bodies themselves have temporal cycles, Nanosecond? What we can say for now is that biosensors mediate temporal calibrations among people, materials, and institutional processes.
Biosensing practices also share a difficult relationship to indexical forms of meaning making. Sensors are designed to indicate. They are designed to point to a phenomenon as if data
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How This Book Is Organized
This book is organized to reflect where the conversations about biosensing actually are, not what kinds of conversation will prove satisfying in any one of those quarters. The various contributions to this book necessarily contain large differences among intellectual traditions, and differences in practical versus theoretical orientations. The authors are not all participating in exactly the same conversation, and neither is the public. My hope is that this collection can thicken some of these connections.
Leaving academia has only strengthened my belief that some academic concepts are too valuable to be left as matters of insider discussion. At the same time, it is foolish to pretend research is not research. In a research publication, there is no avoiding terms of art when they are useful, and simplifying a complex world is not the same thing as actually understanding it. 10 I have tried to find a way to expand engagement with public concerns, while still directly Authors: This is your final opportunity to revise. The MIT Press does not allow revision of content in page proofs.
Page 19 of 33 conveying the research, by asking three people doing important work outside the academy (Estrin, Wolf and Mehta) to join the conversation happening in this small arena of ours. 11 Two of these chapters engage the scholarship directly, and offer their own thoughts in return. Estrin's offers an explanation of why she builds technologies in particular way-important explanations that could go missing if buried under a wider social scientific argument. This was a genuine experiment, in as much as I wanted to know which ideas from the scholarly chapters these contributors would find interesting, and what other ideas they would want to raise for a largely social scientific audience.
In some senses, this editorial choice follows the longstanding tradition in anthropology of directly including voices of the people we study (Clifford and Marcus 1986). As anthropology no longer confines itself to studying the marginalized, we can no longer presume that it the anthropologist's voice that is the voice of privilege. This is not a book written from the margins of social life, though I look forward to someone writing one with respect to biosensing. Here, Authors: This is your final opportunity to revise. The MIT Press does not allow revision of content in page proofs.
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Using the case of direct-to-consumer genomics, they answer affirmatively, while also observing other social practices that cannot be accounted for by the biomedicalization thesis alone. They see new sites of "negotiation, contestation, and diversity that may not be fully biomedicalizable."
Part of what makes room for diversity is the complexity of the datasets themselves. Layers upon layers of abstraction make the connection between DNA data and body not just partial but circuitous, far more indirect that the indexicality I described earlier. This creates room for, say, care and affection between people trying to make sense of the data, or attention to individual biography and experience. It also creates room for false hope. To work on this sort of data presupposes it could contain an answer to one's problems, when in fact there may not be an answer.
In chapter 2, Jamie Sherman takes an entirely different approach to the question of what data's abstractions do for people, and to people. The data that her research participants use are not as complex as in the first chapter, but this brings into sharper relief its connection to aesthetic practice, as opposed to technoscientific logics. Using the work of Walter Benjamin, she argues that we can think about data as a cultural medium of recording analogous to film and photography that came before it. Self-tracking data keep a quasi-abstracted account of one's activities, allowing the tracker to conduct tricks of proximity and distance. Much like the photographic practices of Benjamin's day, these maneuvers afford different vantage points from which to see and experience the self. This self-in-data is never the "whole self" but is comprised of details made separable by the technologies of the day.
In chapter 3, Sophie Day and Celia Lury argue that data cultures push on ideologies of the self more radically than in Sherman's account. They argue that contemporary cultures of observation expose the fictions we in the West tell ourselves about personhood-in other words, Authors: This is your final opportunity to revise. The MIT Press does not allow revision of content in page proofs. to the personhood Sherman describes, which comes into being through attention to separable details. It is also not dissimilar from the "pixelated person" described by Greenfield in chapter 7.
Could it be that pixelation becomes the technoscientific idiom with which the West tiptoes up to a notion of "dividuality," without, perhaps, fully embracing its ramifications in the way the insurance company blood pressure data, it matters little where or how the data were generated, or the nature of the data per se, because overriding this is a normative expectation that employers do not concern themselves with employees' bodies. These authors provide specific, practical guidance for how to trace where data flow, and how to surface the gap between expectations and reality in order to help designers and policymakers identify sources of privacy violation.
In chapter 6, Brittany Fiore-Gartland and Gina Neff help us understand how business school conceptualizations of markets are being mobilized to secure a place for biosensor companies within the U.S. healthcare system. They point out that companies take aim at "disrupting" traditional medicine through biosensing by claiming to "cut out a middleman, while integrating seamlessly all the parts of the middleman's very system that will soon be made obsolete." They argue that companies skirt regulation by delivering "raw data" on an informational basis, yet deliver those data alongside encouragements to talk with a medical professional about it. This effectively outsources much of the interpretive work back to the medical system, without the firm having to pay for that work. The authors see the "democratization" talk used to legitimate such "disruption" as a kind of bait and switch. It mobilizes the sometimes-strong desires of patients for health systems to "give me my damn Authors: This is your final opportunity to revise. The MIT Press does not allow revision of content in page proofs.
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Dana Greenfield writes as both an anthropologist and medical professional. In chapter 7, she addresses the relationship between medicine and self-tracking. While Fiore-Gartland and Neff direct our attention toward a power struggle within a political economy, Greenfield directs our attention to the multiplicity of coexisting medical and paraclinical practices. She focuses on the "n of 1," a trope used within the Quantified Self community to talk about the relation between self-tracking and medical research. When we look at how "n of 1" is invoked, we find a polyvocal concept. Sometimes "n of 1" is about the open-ended tinkering with the protocols of care, which fits well with Mol's (2008) logic of care. It can also be a way to think about massive datasets that scale up to population levels and back down again to an individual, who would receive personalized treatments calculated through the difference between her and the population-level aggregation. It can yet again be a way to interject narrative form back into medical practice. Put together, though, the "n of 1" suggests that self-tracking can be usefully thought of as a paraclinical practice: "By taking up the tools of medicine, but not its claims to expertise, this is medicine turned inside out."
Rajiv Mehta is a Silicon Valley entrepreneur who reflects on the material in part II as someone who has had to make practical decisions about privacy by design and his relationship to the healthcare system. In chapter 8, he helpfully observes that there are serious tradeoffs between preserving privacy by designing better user controls, and enacting legislation that targets harmful use of data (an example of similar policy in the UK can be found in chapter 3). Mehta also calls into question whether "disruption" is actually at work in this market. The apps he designed and sold are calendaring programs adapted for caregivers, and did not remotely come close to Authors: This is your final opportunity to revise. The MIT Press does not allow revision of content in page proofs.
Page 24 of 33 "skirting medical jurisdiction." Still, he had to contend with a powerful assumption that "healthrelated" meant the same thing as medicine, and at every turn was questioned about the extent to which his calendars had been medically vetted. This is not the way disruption works as traditionally understood. The aggressive treatment he received, simply for not giving biomedicine totalizing authority, suggests that more is going on here. Nissenbaum's concern about privacy violations enabled by the free flow of data, and Estrin's concern about the careful technical decisions that need to be made to build systems that make "flows" possible at all. The tension is not over whether there are too few or too many controls on where data are exchanged. All of the authors agree on the importance of controls. Instead, the work of Open mHealth suggests a broader conceptual point. Universal free flow of data does not exist in the way that social science's extensive reliance on the term would have it. The trope of data "flowing" reflects our ability to imagine the connective qualities of data. It is easy to imagine how a piece of location data combined with heart rate data combined with yet more data can paint a detailed picture (and the truly frightening things that can happen when this picture is painted without our consent). However, the material realities do not come together as easily.
Remember my earlier example of two services that do not handle time zones in the same way.
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The data cannot just "flow" between those services, even if the connecting pipes are there. There is friction (Edwards et al. 2011 ) between the datasets themselves, and nontrivial resources are required to remove that friction if someone is going to successfully paint a picture with it. With NSA-sized budgets, such friction is easily overcome, but not so for smaller firms and research projects. Just as there are services that happily expose data to the highest bidder, these frictions create points of nonexchange that hinder entirely appropriate medical research, clinical practice, and personal self-tracking.
In chapter 10, Marc Böhlen gives us a ringside seat to the tradeoffs and uncertainties of building biosensor systems. Böhlen reshapes the capacities of technical systems in an ongoing way, in response to the relationships he builds to both individuals and institutions. He reflects on a moment of calibrating water-testing equipment in Indonesia, in which the calibration of his technical system was really a kind of social and political calibration that made the Indonesian state more at ease with his presence. Through his actions, Böhlen makes evident the sheer complexity of maintaining multiple layers of socio-technical calibrations. Like Open mHealth, his data "flows" were a hard-won outcome of social and technical work. His shuttling between two social institutions, one state-based and focused on health, and the other a less formal but very powerful network of neighborhood organizations, also serves as an important reminder that the institutions that shape medicine and health do not necessarily fight for control over the domain in the way that Mehta experienced in the United States.
In chapter 11, Alex Taylor raises the question of what alternative forms of data might look like, by attempting to make different "cuts" of data. He takes to task the claims of big data proponents who argue that the promise of big data is to learn something new, of human value. If this is so, why do these same proponents launch so few challenges to the preexisting social 9. A notable exception to this rule is genome data, which technically speaking will contain a time stamp (the time at which the sample was taken or processed), but further sampling is largely meaningless as individual genomes do not change.
10. It is a cruel irony that those who are most confused about the public value of the social sciences and humanities are among the quickest to demand simplistic explanations of what researchers do. This is a trap. Time, resources, and generous listening are required to get public and yes, economic, value out of research. If policymakers have trouble seeing the connection between social science and the matters of public import, they would do better to examine the absence of resources available to make this translation, and not the nature of the research itself.
11. Estrin is a computer scientist at Cornell University, but she speaks here as a founder of a nonprofit organization.
12. The interview format is something of a conceit. It indeed took place, though Estrin and her colleague Anna de Paula Hanika edited the text printed here.
